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Hospital Liability: Implications of Recent
Physician's Assistant Statutes
Daniel W. Coyne*
Usually by the time a legitimate problem facing our
society is the subject of a one-hour segment of a television
series,A one is generally safe in assuming that that problem
has reached crisis-proportions.
HAT THIS COUNTRY IS IN THE MIDST of a serious crisis in health care
delivery has been so widely discussed as to have become a
matter of common knowledge. The demand for health care services
in the next generation has been projected to increase at a faster rate
than the corresponding growth in population.1 The cost of medical
care has been skyrocketing and this is in no small sense due to the
increase in malpractice litigation.2 New methods must be devised
to increase the efficient use of the available supply of physicians.
"Among the innovations being tried with physicians is the develop-
ment of new disciplines involving assistants to physicians." Increas-
ing utilization of returning medics from the armed forces is being
undertaken to help relieve the civilian manpower shortage.4 The
legal implications of these developments range from problems of
licensure to considerations of vicarious liability for an assistant's
negligence (malpractice) or for the negligence of the assistant's super-
vising physician. It is with a species of this latter problem that this
paper will be concerned. But one ought to take at least a passing
glance at the professional medical development of this latest member
of the health care team.
Just how and for what a physician's assistant is to be trained is
yet predominantly an unresolved issue. The current status and the
issues involved in the training of physician's assistants were exam-
ined in a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion.5 Twenty programs were generally described and a number of
issues regarding physician's assistants were identified: e.g. role defin-
ition; organization of training programs; career development; rela-
FEditor's Note: This paper was prepared for a seminar at the Harvard Law School in
Medicolegal Problems, offered by Professor William J. Curran.]
*B.A., Marquette University; J.D., Harvard University Law School; Member of the
Illinois Bar.
A National Broadcasting Company, "People Against Doctor Chapman," The Bold Ones
(Dec. 6, 1970). This program dealt with a former Army medic who was charged
with the illegal practice of medicine in the State of California.
1 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower (Nov. 20, 1967).
2 Letter from Kenneth Williamson, Deputy Director of the American Hospital Asso-
ciation to Abraham Ribicoff, in Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Congress, 1st Sess; Medical Malpraectice:
The Patient Versus the Physician 1005 (Comm. Print 1969).
3 Letourneau, The Assistant Physician, 105 HOSPITAL MANACEMZNT 55 (April 1968).
4 N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1970, at 80.
5 Kadish & Long, The Training of Physician Assistants: Status and Issues, 212
I.A.M.A. 1047 (1970).
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tionship to costs of medical care; professional and consumer accept-
ability; etc.6 Yet our concern is not with the medical role definition
of the physician's assistant, 7 although it is realized that the precise
delineations of that definition will undoubtedly have some legal
implications. At the present time there is one central fact to be kept
in mind regarding the physician's assistant-he is a dependent entity s
i.e. he may only legitimately function as an extension of, and under
the control of, a supervising physician. That fact of subordination to
the supervising physician implies automatic liability for the super-
visor-yet what does it portend, if anything, for the question of hos-
pital liability arising out of the use of a physician's assistant?
The question raised above will be analyzed in the context of
three state statutes which have recently been enacted: the California
Physician's Assistant Law adopted in September 1970; 9 the Colorado
Child Health Associate Law adopted in July 1969;10 and the Florida
Exception to the Medical Practice Act authorizing the use of a
"physician's trained assistant" adopted in June 1970.11 The California
law affirmatively encourages the utilization of physician's assistants
by physicians12 and generally authorizes an assistant "to perform
medical services under the supervision of a physician or physicians
approved by the board (State Board of Medical Examiners) to super-
cise such assistant."' 3 The law does not seem to prohibit the employ-
ment of physician's asistants by hospitals but it does restrict any one
physician to the supervision of no more than two physician's assistants
at any one time.' 4 The Colorado law authorizes the licensing of a
child health associate "as an employee of and under the direction
and supervision of a physician whose practice to a substantial extent
is in pediatrics."'5 That wording would seem to preclude direct hos-
pital employment of a child health associate, but still allow employ-
ment by a hospital employed physician. An exception to this restric-
tion allows employment of a child health associate by a government
agency but such an associate must be "individually supervised by a
designated and approved physician."'8 Furthermore, the law strongly
6 Id. at 1049-51.
7 For descriptions of the type of work done generally by physicians assistants see:
Middleton, How New Assistants Will Help Hospital Physicians, HOSPITAL PHsSI-
ClAN, Au9., 1968 at 62; Ingles, A New Health Worker, 68 AM. J. NURSING 1059
(1968); Wall St. J. April 23, 1970, at 1.
s Estes, The Duke Physician Assistant Program: A Progress Report, 17 ARCH. ENVIRON.
HEALTH (Chicago) 690 (1968).
9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (1971).
10 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-10-1 to-15 (Supp. 1969).
11 FLA. STAT. 458.13 (4) (1970).
12 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (1971).
13 Id. § 2511.
14 Id. § 2516. A situation could be envisioned in which a hospital employed physician's
assistant is assigned to a ward and has been approved for supervision by a number
of physiscians (both house and staff).
15 COLo. R '. STAT. ANN. § 91-10-2 (5) (Supp. 1969).
10 id. § 91-10-13.
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implies a one-to-one relationship of physician and assistant.17 The
Florida law is a broadly worded exception to the medical practice
act and as such seems to adopt no restrictions except that "such serv-
ice be rendered under the responsible supervision and control of a
licensed physician."1 8 The problems raised by the licensure question
are numerous and have been,19 or are being,20 competently discussed
elsewhere. To adequately analyze the hospital liability implications
of these recent physician's assistant statutes, it is first necessary to
examine recent trends in hospital liability law.
Trends In The Law Of Hospital Liability
... whether we are willing to accept it or not, we are
practising in an age of expanding liability, and this is true
whether we are talking about the legal profession, the medi-
cal profession, the government, or charitable organizations.B
In the past, an injured patient often was prevented from recover-
ing damages from a hospital by the doctrine of charitable immunity
(most private hospitals are legally classified as non-profit, or charit-
able, corporations) 21 by the doctrine of governmental immunity,22
or by the fact that a hospital was considered to only provide the
physical structure wherein members of the medical profession would
undertake treatment of patients.23 Yet those barriers have for the
most part been discarded. As early as 1942, in a scholarly opinion,
the doctrine of charitable immunity was thoroughly repudiated:24
The incorporated charity should respond as do private
individuals, business corporations and others, when it does.
good in the wrong way.2 5
17 Id. § 91-10-3 (S).
Is FLA. STAT. 458.13 (4) (1970). There are three other States which have enacted ex-
ceptions to their medical acts that authorize delegation by physicians to assistants:
Apiz. REa. STAT. ANN. §32-1421 (1956): KAN. STAT. ANs. §65-2872 g (1964); and
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 492 (1971). This paper will not consider the liability implica-
tions of these three statutes. It is the author's intention only to consider the three
most recent efforts in the Physician's Assistant area.
19 Curran, New Paramedical Personnel-To License or not to License, N.E.J. M. 282:
1085-1086 (1970) (includes a perceptive criticism of the Colorado Child Health
Associate Law); and Department of Community Services, Duke University, Model
Legislation Project for Physician's Assistants (1970) (an excellent analysis of the
issues involved in, and the alternative approaches to, the licensure problem).
20 Address by William J. Curran, Am. Public Health Ass'n. Annual Meeting, Houston,
Tx., Oct. 26, 1970 (An Evaluation of the Ariz., Cal., Colo., Kan., and Okla. ap-
proaches to licensure by a leading authority in the medicolegal field.
B Mueller, The Expanding Duty of the Hospital to the Patient, 47 NEn. L. REv. 397,
338 (1967).
21 For a general discussion of the doctrine of charitable immunity see: PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF "rst LAW OF TomTs, § 127 at 1019-1024 (3rd ed. 1964).
2 Id. at 996-1013, for a general discussion of the doctrine of governmental immunity.
23 Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)
discussed infra at note 31 is an example of this thinking.
24 Presidents and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
25 Id. at 828.
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Since Judge Rutledge's devastating opinion, there has been a definite
trend towards the complete abolition of charitable immunity. Today
only a distinct minority of jurisdictions retain even a remnant of the
doctrine.26 Governmental immunity has followed somewhat the same
course. In 1961, Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme
Court expressed the prevailing attitude:
After re-evaluation of the rule of governmental immunity
from tort liability, we have concluded that it must be dis-
carded as mistaken and unjust.27
The majority of jurisdictions have likewise repudiated the doctrine
of governmental immunity, although the repudiation does not seem
to be as widespread as the rejection of the charitable immunity doc-
trine.2 8 Once over the immunity hurdle, the injured patient had
available two legal theories for recovery against a hospital: re-
spondeat superior 29 and corporate negligence. 30 It is to an examination
of developments in these substantive areas that we now turn.
For years the prevailing rule regarding a hospital and its vicarious
liability for the negligence of a physician was that which prevailed
in a 1914 New York opinion by Justice Benjamin Cardozo:
The wrong was not that of the hospital; it was that of physi-
cians who were not the defendant's servants, but were pur-
suing an independent calling, a profession sanctioned by a
solemn oath, and safeguarded by stringent penalties. If in
serving their patient, they violated her commands, the re-
sponsibility is not the defendant's; it is theirs. There is no
distinction in that respect between the visiting and the res-
ident physicians.3 1
However, since then, great inroads have been made into the above
theory. In 1952, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a case 32 wherein
a resident physician in a hospital was negligent in inspecting the
traction on a broken leg, specifically refused to follow the above
theory:
26 LOUISSLL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, No. 17.07-17.57, at 529-540.7 (1970).
For a summary of the state of the law when written see: Horty, The Status of
the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in Hospital Cases, 25 OHIo ST. L. J. 343 (1964).
27 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 213, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90, 359 P.2d
457, 458 (1961).
28 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, sura note 26.
2 "The recognized rule is that an employer is liable to a third person for an injury
to either person or property which results from the tortious conduct of an employee
acting within the scope of his employment." 35 AM. JuR. Master and Servant § 552
at 983 (1941).
30 "Corporate negligence is the failure of those entrusted with the task of providing
the accommodations and facilities necessary to carry out the charitable purposes of
the corporation to follow in a given situation the established standard of conduct
to which the corporation should conform." Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue,
148 Conn. 449, 453 172 A.2d 192, 194 (1961).
31 Schloendoerff v. The Society of the New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 94
(1914). This case involved a patient who had consented to an examination by a
resident but not to an operation. While the patient was under anesthesia, the res-
ident operated and gangrene set in.
32 Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
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While it appears from the record that the staff doctors
have the final responsibility for the care of patients and that
they supervise the activities of the resident doctor to some
extent, there is nothing to indicate that this supervision ex-
tends to the duties which the residents perform as a part of
the general hospital routine. 33
It does not seem reasonable to us to characterize a res-
ident doctor . . . as an independent contractor while he per-
forms the routine hospital functions for which he is hired
it is clear that the residents are paid employees . . .34
The relationship of a resident to a hospital is not unlike
that of an interne or nurse. All three groups are specially
and highly trained. All three are engaged in supplying the
element of trained medical care which distinguishes a hos-
pital from a hotel. Under these circumstances, we must hold
that resident doctor who receives his compensation from the
hospital while providing medical care as part of regular hos-
pital routine is a servant of the hospital so as to make the hos-
pital liable for his negligence under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.3
5
The growing responsibility of a hospital is implicit in the above
quoted excerpts from the Moeller case.
However, the theoretical foundation for the recent expansion
or institutional responsibility for hospitals was set forth in the land-
mark opinion of Justice Fuld in Bing v. Thunig36 (a case which on its
facts applied only to nurses):
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to
treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doc-
tors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure
them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects
the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation
plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses and internes, as well as adminis-
trative and manual workers, and they charge patients for
medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if
necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails
himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will
attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees
will act on their own responsibility.
Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities
borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue their
exemption from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The
test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or
profit-making, as it is for every other employer, was the
person who committed the negligent injury-producing act
one of its employees and, if he was acting within the scope
of his employment.
37
3 Id. at 377, 54 N.W.2d at 645.
84 Id. at 379, 54 N.W.2d at 645.
35 Id., 54 N.W.2d at 646.
36 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
37 Id. at 666-667, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
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With that opinion the stage was set for the application of the
corporate negligence theory to hospitals.
On a November Saturday in 1960 a young man was playing foot-
ball for his college team, was injured, and the injury was diagnosed
as two broken bones below the right knee. A cast (later found to
have been too tight) was applied by a 58-year old general practitioner.
The patient complained often of severe pain but his complaints were
virtually ignored. By the time a specialist was consulted, decay had
proceeded to the point where it was necessary to amputate the pa-
tiient's right leg eight inches below the knee. The treating physician
settled out of court, but recovery was sought against the hospital
on the theory that the hospital owed a.duty to a patient to oversee
his care and treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court, in the contro-
versial Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital case,38 held
that the failure of the hospital to review the general practitioner's
work or to require consultation could reasonably have been found
to have been negligence. However, the true significance of the Darling
case may only be had by an examination of Justice Walter Schaeffer's
powerful opinion.
In discussing the standard of care required of a hospital, the
Illinois Court cited with approval the above quotation from Bing v.
Thunig.3 9 But the court did not stop with a statement of that theory,
it went on to approve the introduction into evidence of: (1) the rules
and regulations of the Illinois Department of Public Health under the
Hospital Licensing Act, (2) the standards for hospital accreditation
of the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Hospitals, and (3) the
by-laws, rules, and regulations of the defendant hospital; in the
determination of the standard of care for determining hospital
liability:
The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state li-
censing regulations and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate
that the medical profession and other responsible authorities
regard it as both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume
certain responsibilities for the care of the patient.40
The decision also held that conformity with the standard of care
customarily followed by hospitals generally in its community was not
to be conclusive in the determination of whether or not the defen-
dant hospital had met the applicable standard of care. In other
words, such conformity was only evidence of the observation of the
required reasonable conduct as determined by the jury.
38 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 11.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), rert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). A full comprehension of the aggravated
nature of the negligence in this case can only be had by a reading of the opinion
of the lower appellate court, 50 I1. App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964). For a
critical commentary on the Darling Case see: Note, Hospital Liability-A New Duty
of Care, 19 MAINE L. REv. 102 (1967).
39 Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
40 Id.
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The reaction of the American Medical Association to the Darling
case was quickly and clearly expressed;
The effect of this decision is unfortunate, since it appears
to place a hospital in the position where it must exercise con-
trol over the practice of medicine by physicians on its attend-
ing staff to avoid liability. This is apt to encourage control of
the practice of medicine by persons who are not licensed
physicians. The decision is also unfortunate because it is apt
to discourage the adoption of high standards which are in-
tended to improve the level of hospital care, but which may
now be misinterpreted as a basis for liability.41
The hospital has clearly been given a new standard of care to which
it will be held responsible (at least in Illinois). Two writers have
expressed the method by which courts will judge hospitals:
The effect of the Darling decision, when considered with
the Bing case and others, is to state that the hospital has a
direct duty to the patient to provide medical services con-
sistent with regulatory and professionally accepted stand-
ards . 42
The State of Michigan has even gone so far as to apparently ex-
press this new duty by statute: "The governing board of each hospital
shall be responsible for the operation of the hospital, the selection
of the medical staff, and for the quality of care rendered in the hos-
pital.48
It should be evident that there is a definite trend towards hold-
ing a hospital liable either for the negligence of an employee or for
its failure to have properly overseen patient care on its premises.
Defense counsel faced with a malpractice charge against
a hospital would be unwise to rely too strongly on earlier
decisions holding that a hospital cannot be made liable for the
results of improper medical treatment administered by a non-
employee physician. If it is true that hospitals do, under the
modern practice, effectively guide and control the actions of
the doctors using their facilities, it is almost inevitable that,
sooner or later, responsibility will follow this power. 44
The structure and operation of a modern hospital have brought
about increased legal responsibility. "The fundamental trends in the
law of hospital liability clearly show that the institutionalization of
medical care results in the institutionalization of liability.45
41 12 Citation 82 (1965).
42 Shain & Southwick, State Licensing Regulations and Hospital Liability, PUBLIC
HEALTH REFORTS 582 (July 1966).
43 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANs. § 331.422 (1968), (Emphasis supplied). As of January 8,
1971, there were no regulations adopted which further defined the above duty.
Letter from Hermann A. Ziel Jr., M.D., Chief of Bureau of Health Facilities, De-
partment of Public Health, State of Michigan, to author, Jan. 8, 1971.
44 Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 873 at 879 (1967).
45 Southwick, The Hospital's Neo Responsibility, 17 CLEVE. MAR. L. REV. 146 at 159(1968).
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Hospital Liability and the Physician's Assistant 46
Will the emergence of the physician's assistant as a separately
sanctioned member of the health care delivery team increase the
potential liability of a hospital? As noted above, the liability implica-
tions of three recent physician's assistant authorization statutes will
be examined. A comparative approach, on the basis of issues involved,
to this analysis has been chosen. It is intended that this approach
will aid in the development of conclusions as to what the law ought
to be in this matter. However within the discussion of each issue, the
section that deals with each State will be readily identifiable by the
reader so that he might more easily examine each State by itself.
Trends in the Law of Hospital Liability
California
California had completely abandoned the doctrine of charitable
immunity in 1951. 47 The doctrine of governmental immunity was
discarded in 1961. 48 Following the judicial repudiation of govern-
mental immunity, the California legislature enacted a statute provid-
ing that all government hospitals are generally subject to tort liabil-
ity 49 That statute, and its exceptions, is of course the controlling law.
The emphasis in California has been on liability via respondeat
superior rather than under a theory of corporate negligence. The
noted case of Seneris v. Haas5° is indicative of this inclination. In that
case, a patient, who had been admitted to the hospital as a routine
obstetrical case, had an uncomplicated delivery of a baby girl, had
undergone a spinal anesthetic, and had awakened the next morning
unable to move her legs, sought damages from the hospital for the
alleged negligence of the anesthesiologist. The hospital was held
liable under a theory of respondeat superior as the defendant anes-
thesiologist practiced at no other hospitals, had no office of his own,
and was found to be an "ostensible agent" of the hospital. Yet there
are limits to the application of respondent superior for the negligence
of a physician. In Mayers v. Litow,51 the appellate court affirmed a
nonsuit against a hospital for the alleged negligence of two doctors
who were on its staff and had allegedly damaged the recurrent laryn-
46 This discussion assumes: that the Physician's Assistant would be properly qualified
and licensed; that the hospital was not negligent in employing or extending staff
privileges to the supervising physician; any negligence of the Physician's Assistant
would occur in his role as Physician's Assistant (i.e. not driving an ambulance or
doing some non-medical care related task) ; and that the patient involved has given
his informed consent to be cared for by a Physician's Assistant, et. Inderbitzen v.
Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.App. 462, 12 P.2d 744 (1932). (Medical students examined
patient without her consent). These assumptions apply throughout this study.
47 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d, 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
48 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 213, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90, 359 P.2d
457, 458 (1961).
49 CAL. GOVT. COoE § 815.2 (1966).
50 Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
51 Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal.App.2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957).
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geal nerve in the course of a thyroidectomy. "Normally the question
of agency is one of fact for the jury . ..But in this case there is
nothing in the record from which it may legitimately be inferred
that defendant Litow or Dr. Feinstein was an agent or employee of
the hospital." 52 Thus although it appears that the California courts
are willing to invoke respondeat superior against a hospital, there
must be some connection between the physician and the hospital
other than mere staff privileges for the doctrine to apply.
No reported cases in California were found which held a hospital
liable for the negligence of a physician under a theory of corporate
negligence. Nor were any statutes or regulations located which might
serve as a basis for a finding of a breach of an institutional duty of
a hospital to a patient for the quality of care rendered. However,
there have been cases involving the responsibility of a hospital
to ensure adequate nursing care,5 3 but those have all been founded
on a theory of respondeat superior. Thus, it would seem, that to
hold a hospital liable in California as a result of deficient medical
care, the negligence must be on the part of an employee, or an agent,
of the hospital.
Colorado
The state of the law of hospital liability in Colorado is in marked
contrast to that of California. Colorado still retains a remnant of
the charitable immunity doctrine in that no execution of a judgment
may be had upon any property or funds dedicated to a hospital's
charitable purpose.54 But note that a suit may be maintained and a
judgment rendered against a hospital which is a charitable institution.
The doctrine of governmental immunity is still in force: ". . . in the
absence of a statute creating such liability, the state and its instru-
mentalities are not liable in tort.55 No statutes were discovered which
waived such immunity and in 1967 a Colorado court specifically
refused to deal with the question of the effect of liability insurance
on the liability of a unit of government. 56 Thus, it appears as if there
remain substantial immunity obstacles to recovery against a hospital
in Colorado.
Perhaps as a result of the above roadblocks to a suit, Colorado
has refused to hold a hospital liable for the negligence of its employee-
physicians. The judicial reasoning of Colorado was clearly expressed
in the dismissal of a complaint against a mining company (which
was not a charitable institution) which had operated a hospital and
52 Id. at 417-18, 316 P.2d at 354.
53 E.g., Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp. 27 Cal.2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945) and
Mundt v. Alta Bates Hospital, 223 Cal. App.2d 413, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1963).
54 Hemenway v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n. of Colorado, 161 Colo. 42, 419 P.2d 312
(1966).
55 Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 242, 353 P.2d 609, 610 (1960).
58 Valdez v. County of Moffat, 161 Colo. 361, 423 P.2d 7 (1967).
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had employed a surgeon who had negligently left a large gauze pad
within the patient's abdomen.
The relation between doctor and patient is personal. That
a hospital employs doctors on its staff does not make it liable
for the discharge of their professional duty, since it is power-
less, under the law, to command or forbid any act by them in
the practice of their profession. Unless it employs those whose
want of skill is known, or should be known, to it, or by some
special conduct or neglect makes itself responsible for their
malpractice it cannot be held liable therefor.57
Note that the last sentence of the above quotation appears to allow
for the possibility of holding a hospital liable for the negligence of
a physician under exceptional circumstances.
Yet even in Colorado the national trend towards increased insti-
tutional liability for hospitals is beginning to have an effect. The
landmark case of Bernardi v. Community Hospital Association"8 held a
hospital liable under the heretofore rejected theory of respondeat
superior for the negligence of a nurse-employee in giving an injection
to a patient into or near the sciatic nerve thereby causing the patient
to lose the normal use of her right foot.
In this day and age a hospital should be responsible for
the acts of its nurses within the scope of their employment,
irrespective of whether they are acting administratively or
professionally.59
However, the court went on to comment: "Expressly this opinion
relates only to nurses. Also, it should be borne in mind that this
decision relates only to the case in which the nurse acts out of the
presence of the doctor.60 On its facts the decision can be said to be
a quite narrow ruling, however, one must often look to the dictum
to comprehend the development of the law. The Court not only cited
the Bing6l case with approval, it quoted more than a full page in the
reports from the Bing opinion.62 Yet, for the purposes of this paper, it
must be noted that it was the hospital, and not the doctor, that was
in the position of supervision and control over the negligent nurse.
Florida
Charitable immunity in Florida was abolished as to paying pa-
tients in 194063 and stated to have been wholly abandoned by 1953.64
The question as to whether or not a government hospital is answer-
able in tort depends on which level of government operates the
57 Rosanne v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 366, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944). This reasoning was
followed in a 1962 case alleging hospital responsibility for the negligence of a sur-
gical resident. Moon v. Mercy Hospital, 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).
58 Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n., 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968).
9 Id. at 713.
60 Id.
1 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d (1957).
62 Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n., 443 P.2d at 711-713.
6 Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
04 Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953) (dictum).
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hospital. Municipal hospitals are subject to tort liability to all per-
sons; 65 county hospitals are subject to tort liability to paying pa-
tients; 66 while State hospitals enjoy immunity unless the State seeks
to recover damages in tort in which case it would be subject to a
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence (a
highly unlikely, though not impossible, situation in a case involving
a Physician's Assistant).67 After one works his way through the above
maze, he is welcomed by a sensible set of rules devised by the courts
of Florida on the subject of hospital liability.
Florida is in accord with the afore-discussed national trend
towards a greater potential for hospital liability. Although the Florida
courts have been expanding the scope of vicarious liability for the
hospital, something more than the mere use of its premises must be
alleged in order to state a legitimate cause of action.68 Yet the Florida
judiciary is willing to hold a hospital liable where it is determined
that the negligent professional was an employee or an agent of the
defendant hospital: ". . . the rule that under the doctrine of respondeat
superior a hospital, private or charitable, is liable for the torts of its
employees. Such is the rule in this state.69 In other words, respondeat
superior is applied whenever an employment or agency relationship
has been determined to exist.
Perhaps the most significant case for Physician's Assistants and
hospital liability involved an intern who allegedly was negligent in
the treatment of the patient of a private physician. 70 The significant
fact is that in Florida interns are not required to be licensed to prac-
tice in a hospital 7' and in this case the intern was not licensed.
While admittedly the activities of the intern were most likely much
more extensive than those which would be undertaken by a Physi-
cian's Assistant, the resaoning of the court is nevertheless relevant
in assessing how it would handle a problem involving a Physician's
Assistant:
The important question is not whether or not he re-
mains the servant of the general employer as to matters
generally, but whether or not, as to the act in question, he
is acting in the business of and under the direction of one or
the other.72
Thus, the test seems to be broader than solely a question of who is
the employer. The fact of control is significant, if not dispositive, of
an allegation of vicarious liability for the negligence of one assisting
an independent physician.
65 City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1953).
66 Suwanee County Hosp. Corp. v. Golden, 56 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1952)..
67 Fla. Extraordinary Session House Bill No. 49-XX, Ch. 67-2204 (1967).
68 Snead v. Lejeune Road Hosp. Inc., 196 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1967).
69 Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So.2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1953).
70 Parmerter v. Osteopathic General Hosp., 196 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1967).
T1 FLA. STAT. 458.13 (4) (1970)*.
72 Parmerter v. Osteopathic General Hosp., 196 So.2d 505, 507 (1967), citing RIs.rATE-
MENT O F AGcECY 2d § 227 (1958).
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The courts of Florida while having restricted their hospital
liability law to respondeat superior in the final disposition of any
case, have nonetheless expressed concepts which might someday
find themselves the basis of an opinion holding a hospital liable under
a theory of corporate negligence. In 1966 a Florida appellate court
reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant hospital in a
wrongful death action wherein the deceased had been discharged
from the hospital and died within eleven hours of an subdural hema-
toma.73 The court said that the hospital employees might not have
exercised "such reasonable care toward the deceased as his known
condition required." In 1967, in another wrongful death action, a
Florida court reversed the granting 'of a motion for summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant hospital. T4 The deceased had expired
within one month after receiving an injection of demerol and sco-
polamine as prescribed by her physician. The physician had not
sought consultation which might have led to a cesarean section rather
than the ill-fated inducement of labor. The court observed that the
amount of care to be exercised by a hospital "is measured by the
capacity of the patient to care for herself." The seed for the*future
emergence of the doctrine of corporate negligence for hospitals, has
been sown in Florida. When and if the doctrine will be adopted is a
topic for another-.paper.
Liability Implications of the Physician's Assistant Statute Itself
California
The California Physician's Assistant Law requires that a Physi-
cian's Assistant be supervised by a physician who has been approved
by the State Board of Medical Examiners to supervise such assistant.7 5
Yet that section and other provisions of the law do not seem to pre-
clude the employment of. a Physician's Assistant by a hospital. But
if a .hospital intends to employ a- Physician's Assistant it should
ensure.:. (1) that any physician who might utilize an assistant's serv-
ices has 'been approved to supervise.such assistant; 76 (2) that any
potential" supervising physician not supervise more than two. Physi-
cian's Assistants at any one time; 77 and (3) that any task performed
by a Physician's Assistant be within the job description submitted
to the State Board of Medical Examiners.78 Violation of any one of
these above provisions would- constitute admissible evidence of de-
parture from a statutory requirement, but it would not be conclusive
as to negligence and causation in any given liability suit. Further-
more, there is a brief list of medical services which may not be per-
7s Reeves v. North Brownard Hosp. Dist., 191 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1966).
74 Lab v. Hall, 200 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1967).
75 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2510 (1971).
76 id.
T Id. at § 2516.
78 Id. at § 2516 (c).
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formed by any Physician's Assistant; 79 a hospital should make it clear
to all involved with such assistants that these prohibitions are to be
strictly observed.
The heart of the California Physician's Assistant Law for liability
purposes is §2512 which sets forth the general authorization for this
latest category of health professional:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physi-
cian's assistant may perform medical service when such
services are rendered under the supervision of a licensed
physician or physicians approved by the board.80
Responsibility has been placed in the hands of the supervising physi-
cian and there seems to be little doubt but that such physician would
be held liable for the negligence of an assistant-supervisee or for his
own negligent supervision of the assistant. Yet what of a hospital
which employs an assistant? of the hospital whose physician-employee
employs the assistant? or of the hospital where a physician with
staff privileges whose assistant is negligent?8'
Colorado
The Colorado Child Health Associate Law is a fine example of
much that is wrong with medical licensure laws. Although the Colo-
rado legislature is to be applauded for its concern for the protection
of patients, this complex statute certainly appears to be a case where
the cure may be worse than the problem it was designed to attack.
The law is not only overly detailed, but it is also overly restrictive
regarding the activities of the Child Health Associate.82 The liability
implications for an employing physician are evident and are even
somewhat set forth in the statute itself:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to relieve the
physician of the professional or legal responsibilities for the
care and treatment of his patients .... a physician . . shall
not delegate to a child health associate the performance of, or
permit a child health associate to perform, any act or duty
not authorized by this article, and such physician shall exer-
cise such direction, supervision, and control over such child
health associate as will assure the patients under the care
of such child health associate will receive medical care and
treatment of high quality.83
That would appear to create a rather high standard of care regarding
the duty of a physician to his patient when utilizing a Child Health
Associate. But what of the hospital which might become involved,
what is its potential liability?
To Id. at 2514.
so Id. at § 2512.
81 Various hypothetical situations will be considered later in this paper.
82 For an excellent evaluation of the Colo. law see: Curran, Newo Paramedical Per-
sonnet-to License or Not to Licenser N.EJ.M. 282: 1085-86 (1970).
83 Cow. REV. STAT. Awiq., 91-10-4 (Supp. 1969).
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The implications of the Colorado law are that a private (profit
or non-profit) hospital may not directly employ a Child Health Asso-
ciate as the act consistently speaks of the "employing physician.8 4
In addition, there is a specific exclusionary provision which allows
a federal, state, county, or municipal agency to employ a Child Health
Associate if he is individually supervised by a designated and ap-
proved physician who shall supervise only one such Child Health
Associate.85 Furthermore, the section on limitation on practice pro-
vides that:
A child health associate may render pediatric services
outside the professional offices of the employing physician if
such services either are rendered in the direct and personal
presence of such physician, or consist of the follow up care
of a patient pursuant to the specific directions of such physi-
cian related to that particular patient.8
6
Thus, it appears as if the Colorado law contemplates no significant
involvement by a hospital with the practice of Child Health Asso-
ciates. Even the exception for government hospitals contemplates
individual supervision and control by a licensed physician. What
appears to be potential sword of liability against supervising physi-
cians, would also appear to be a shield against the liability of hos-
pitals (assuming no repeated and flagrant violations of the statute
within a particular hospital).
Florida
As the Florida Physician's Assistant legislation is in the form of
an exception to the Medical Practice Act, space permits its full
quotation:
Nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prohibit
service rendered by a physician's trained assistant .... if such
service be rendered under the responsible supervision and
control of a licensed physician.8 7
The Florida law is an enabling act which on its face merely removes
the prohibition against the use of unlicensed personnel. Accordingly,
there is nothing which indicates that a Physician's Assistant may not
be employed by a hospital and at least have the hospital subject
preliminarily to an allegation of respondeat superior for its employee's
negligence. However, does the statutory requirement that the service
"be rendered under the responsible supervision and control of a li-
censed physician" necessarily operate to make the assistant the
"borrowed servant" of the physician-thus relieving the hospital of
liability if the physician himself is not its employee or agent? Both
the "borrowed servant" rule and the question of hospital liability for
84 Id. at 91-10-3 (1) (4) (5) (6) (7).
85 Id. at 91-10-13 (d).
s6 Id. at 91-10-3.
ST FLA. STAT. 458.13 (4) (1970).
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Physician's Assistant in the context of current law will'be considered
below.
The Physician's Assistant and the Borrowed Servant Rule
88
The borrowed servant rule has been defined as:
The rule is plain that when the general employer
assigns his servant to duty for another and surrenders to the
other direction and control in relation to the work to be done,
the servant becomes the servant of the other insofar as his
services relate to the work so controlled and directed. His
general employer is no longer liable for the servant's torts
comitted in the directed and controlled work.89
It should be noted that in the case of personnel who have independent
as Well as dependent functions, such as nurses, the question as to
when responsibility of the controlling physician began is one of fact
usually left to the jury.9 0 But also note that the Physician's Assistant
by definition is a dependent individual-subordinate to a licensed
physician. It would thus appear that the "borrowed servant" rule
would most 'often operate to relieve a hospital from liability for one
of'its own" Physician's Assistants.-In fact, the only situation in which
the application of the borrowed servant rule would be applied to
a hospital would be where one of its employee-physicians borrowed
an independent physician's subordinate and the law was inclined to
hold the hospital responsible for the negligence of a physician under
respondeat superior. The law with respect to borrowed servants and
Physician's Assistants in California, Colorado, and Florida will now
be examined.
California
As discussed above, §2513 of the California Physician's Assistant
Law directs that the services of a Physician's Assistant are to be
"rendered under the supervision of a licensed physician... approved
by the board." The law does not contemplate the lending of assistants
amongst physicians as a physician must be prospectively approved
to supervise any Physician's Assistant. Thus, it would appear that
under the Califor nia law the borrowed servant problem really does
not exist for the law usually assigns responsibility where affirmative
approyal of a power '(here the power to supervise x assistant) has been
sought. It is this author's contention, in the light of the present law
of hospital liability in California, that vicarious liability for California
hospitals in cases involving Physician's Assistants will not turn on
who employed the assistant, but rather on who employed the super-
vising physician.
88 Generally regarding the borrowed servant rule and medical personnel, see: Liability
of Operating Surgeon for Negligence of Nurse Assisting Him, 12 A.L.R.3d 1017
(1967).
89 St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 5'58, 561, 4.N.W.2d 637,
638 (1942).
90 Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957).
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'-'ColoradoAs noted above, Colorado's Child Health Associate Law does not
contemplate direct involvement of hospitals with Child Health As-
sociates. The Colorado law strongly implies a one-to-one' relationship
between the physician and his new subordinate. As in California,
supervising physicians must receive prospective approval to legiti-
mately supervise a Child Health Associate. In addition, the Colorado
law explicitly states that "Nothing in this act shall be construed to
relieve the physician of . . . legal responsibility for the treatment of
his patients." 91 Considering the stringent requirements of prospective
individual approval of a supervising physician under the Colorado
law, the borrowed servant problem does not seem to be able to occur
without a violation of the statute. Such a violation would have grave
liability implications for the illegally supervising physician and would
appear to protect even an employer-hospital-unless it had reason
to know of the violation in time to stop it.
Florida
The borrowed servant situation would be most likely to occur
under the Florida statute as it is the only one of the three statutes
examined which does not require some form of prospective approval
in order to legitimately supervise a Physician's Assistant. Assuming
a borrowed servant situation occurs and negligence ensues, what sort
of an analysis will the Florida courts employ to assign liability? The
statute speaks in terms of "responsible supervision and control" and
the general legal maxim is that responsibility follows control. Usually
the question of right to control is left to the fact-finder, 92 however
when a statute imposes a duty to control then the question of right
to control becomes one of law, not of fact. Thus, it would appear as
if the decisive question as to the vicarious liability of a hospital for
negligence involving a Physician's Assistant would not be who con-
trolled the assistant (by law the physician had a duty to control
the assistant), but rather was the supervising physician an employee
(or agent) of the defendant hospital, and was the hospital subject to
liability if one of its employee-physicians was held accountable in a
case involving a Physician's Assistant?
Hospital Liability in Four Cases Involving Physician's Assistants
The four hypothetical cases considered below will be analyzed
in the context of the relevant law in each of the three jurisdictions
whose Physician's Assistant Statutes have been under consideration.
The reader is strongly advised to reread the sections reviewing the
trends in the law of hospital liability in each of the three States.
The negligence in these cases could have occurred either by the
Physician's Assistant himself or in the course of the supervision by
the physician.
91 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN., 91-10-4 (Supp. 1969).
9Z Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1967).
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(1) The Physician's Assistant who was acting under the supervision
and control of a physician who is not an employee (or agent) of the
defendant hospital but does have staff privileges at the hospital.
California
As has been observed, the California courts have tended to base
hospital liability on the existence or non-existence of an employment
or agency relationship between the physician and the hospital. In
the instant case, the courts would be most likely not to hold the hos-
pital liable on the basis of the reasoning expressed in Mayers v. Litow,93
which held that a hospital was not liable for the negligence of an
independent physician who merely used the hospital's facilities. This
would appear to be the result whether it was the Physician's Assis-
tant himself who was negligent or whether it was the physician who
was found to have been negligent in his supervisory duties. Even if
the Physician's Assistant were an employee of the hospital in this
case (as unlikely as that may be under the present law), the appli-
cation of the borrowed servant doctrine would operate to relieve the
hospital of any liability for the negligence of an assistant who was
under the control of an independent physician.
Colorado
There is no doubt that Colorado would not hold a hospital liable
on the facts presented (assuming the immunity barriers could be
overcome). The language of the Child Health Associate Law itself,94
as well as the prevailing case law in Colorado95 would dictate the
granting of a motion for summary judgment on the facts presented.
Even the far-reaching Bernardi case96 could not be cited as a basis
for hospital liability in this case as that case involved a nurse-em-
ployee who although acting pursuant to the orders of a physician,
was acting out of his presence and in her authorized independent
professional status. In the unusual case where the Child Health Asso-
ciate would be the employee of a government hospital, the hospital
would avoid liability on the theory that the Associate was under the
statutorily imposed supervision and control of an independent physi-
cian whose professional activities, as we have seen, the hospital could
not control. Of course, this all assumes that the government hospital
would be open to suit, which is not at all assured in Colorado. 97
Florida
The courts of Florida would be most likely on these facts to follow
the reasoning expressed in Snead v. Leleune Road Hospital Inc.98
wherein an action was dismissed against a hospital because it was
93 Mayers v. Litow, 154 Cal. App2d 413, 316 P.2d 351 (1957).
94 See the discussion of the liability implications of the statute itself, junra note 82-86.
95 The judicial thought in Colorado was examined supra note 54-62.
99 Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n., 443 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1968).
97 See discussion of governmental immunity in Colorado, soura note 55-56.
98 Snead v. LeJeune Road Hosp. Inc., 196 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1967).
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based on the alleged negligence of an independent physician whose
only connection with the hospital was that he possessed staff privil-
eges. While it is quite possible for a Physician's Assistant to be em-
ployed by a hospital under the Florida law, the decisive fact in this
question is that such an assistant would be under the supervision
and control of an independent physician who would be held singularly
responsible in the event of any negligence in the supervision or actions
of the assistant. In other words, if the Physician's Assistant were an
employee of the hospital, that fact would be more than offset by the
independent status of the supervising physician and the operation of
the borrowed servant doctrine.
(2) The Physician's Assistant who was acting under the supervision
and control of a physician who is neither a resident nor an intern but
has been determined to be either an employee or an agent of the
defendant hospital.
California
Since the California courts appear to determine hospital liability
on the basis of whether or not there was an employment relationship,
it would be most likely that they would hold the hospital liable on
these facts. The hospital could argue that it is unable to control the
professional actions of a licensed physician, and thus should not be
held liable for something it is not able to direct and control. Yet,
the California courts have rejected that very argument. The Calif-
ornia judiciary has not based its application of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior on the right to control, but rather on the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. In other words, if a physician-
employee (agent) is liable for something arising out of or in the course
of his employment by the defendant hospital, then the hospital-em-
ployer (principal) ought to be held vicariously liable as would any
other employer. The California courts have clearly rejected any
notion that a salaried physician is an independent contractor.
Colorado
Colorado would not hold the hospital liable on these facts. The
Colorado courts have consistently without exception considered a
physician to be at all times an independent contractor in pursuit of
an independent profession. Thus, a hospital is not in a position to
control his actions and should correspondingly not be held responsible
for his professional shortcomings. The addition of the Child Health
Associate and his enabling legislation only serve to reinforce the
above rationale as the physician is personally charged by the statute
with responsibility for the care and treatment of patients when
utilizing a Child Health Associate. 99
9 CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 91-10-4 (Supp. 1969).
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Florida
The law in Florida on these facts would most likely result in
liability for the defendant hospital. Given the existence of an em-
ployment or agency relationship, the Florida courts have held a
hospital liable for the negligence of its physician-employees. 10 0 The
addition of the Physician's Assistant does not appear to alter the
result as the main thrust of the activity would be that the physician
and the Physician's Assistant were acting on behalf of the defendant
hospital. However, it is this author's impression that the Florida
courts do not seem as wedded to the application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior in these circumstances as do the courts of Calif-
ornia. Accordingly, it would appear as if a hospital would have at least
some chance of avoiding liability if it argued that since it had no
control over the Physician's Assistant it should not be held liable
for his negligence. But note that even if that argument were to
succeed (which is unlikely), if the negligence were that of the super-
vising physician, the original analysis of respondeat superior on the
basis of an employment relationship would be applicable.
(3) The Physician's Assistant who was acting under the supervision
and control of a resident or intern who was in the employ of the
defendant hospital.
California
The law would appear to be even clearer in this case than it was
in fact situation No. 2 above. The defendant hospital would most
likely be held liable for the reasons expressed therein. Note that a
resident or intern is much more subject to the control of the insti-
tution wherein he does his residency or internship than is the salaried
physician subject to the control of his employing hospital.
Colorado
The result in Colorado would likewise appear to be the same
as in fact situation No. 2 above. However, it must be observed that
the Bernardi case, while on its face definitely does not indicate insti-
tutional liability in this situation, has strong implications for hospital
liability in the future. Yet even the expansive thinking expressed in
the dictum of the Bernardi case has been negated by the structure of
the Child Health Associate licensing law. Thus, while the Bernardi
case may have long-range implications for the liability of hospitals
for the negligence of residents and/or interns, the language of the
Child Health Associate law would most probably operate to insulate
a hospital from liability in a case involving a Child Health Associate.
10 Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954). Hospital was held liable for an overdose
of an X-ray treatment by a physician employee who was acting on behalf of the
hospital.
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Florida
The law in Florida would appear to indicate liability for the de-
fendant hospital on these facts for the same reasons enunciated above
in fact situation No. 2. This case is more likely to result in liability
as, by definition, it involves an employment relation and excludes
the less connective agency relationship.
(4) The Physician's Assistant and potential hospital liability under
a theory of corporate negligence. 01
California
As has been previously noted,10 2 no reported cases were dis-
covered which held a Californiahospital liable on a theory of cor-
porate negligence. The dispositive question in hospital liability cases
in California appears to be the existence or non-existence of an em-
ployment relation between the involved physician and the defen-
dant hospital. Thus, corporate negligence would only seem to be
critical in a case involving an independent physician, although it
may be relevant in terms of aggravation in other cases. Corporate
negligence could be alleged if a pattern of malpractice or incompe-
tence were established, but those are not the types of case with which
we are concerned. Our concern is with the one-time occurrence of
negligence (the usual malpractice case which is the unusual medical
case).
Since that is our framework, it would appear as if corporate
negligence could only be argued with any hope of success if statutory
or self-imposed rules were shown to have been violated. Yet even
if such violations were established, it would be necssary to demon-
strate that the hospital had taken no precautions 'to prevent their
occurrence, the hospital had reason to know of their probable occur-
rence, the hospital had not made certain statutory or institutional
duties clear to all involved with Physician's Assistants (such as the
prohibitions expressed in Section 2514 of the California law), or the
hospital had not ensured that the patient ostensibly knew of and had
consented to treatment involving a Physician's Assistant. Corporate
negligence as applied to hospitals for medical maltreatment is yet. a
fairly recent doctrine. Accordingly, it is most likely that it will only
be in cases of flagrant or repeated violation of statutory or self-
imposed rules that a hospital will be held liable on a theory of cor-
porate negligence in a case involving a Physician's Assistant under
the present California Physician's Assistant Law.
101 Note that this discussion must of necessity be in general terms for each fact situa-
tion would be significantly affected by the individual peculiarities, regulations, and
bylaws of the hospital involved.
102 E.g., Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal.2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945); Mundt
v. AltaBates Hoisp4 223 Cal. A'pp.2d 413, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1963).
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Colorado
Corporate negligence of a hospital for medical maltreatment of
a patient is a non-existent doctrine in Colorado. As has been pre-
viously observed, the hospital in Colorado is not thought of as being
institutionally responsible for the medical care afforded patients on
its premises (although Bernardi has begun to make inroads into this
theory). Assuming no flagrant or repeated violations of statutory or
self-imposed rules, a Colorado hospital will most likely not be held
liable on a theory of corporate negligence in a case involving a Child
Health Associate. This is not to say that a Colorado hospital need not
be concerned with the specifics of the Child Health Associate Law,
for the pitfalls in that statute are many.
Florida
Presently no cases have been found that have held a Florida
hospital liable on a theory of corporate negligence. But as noted
above, 10 3 there has been suggestions of potential liability for a hos-
pital for failure to provide care commensurate with the capacity of
the patient to care for himself. However, these cases involved only
preliminary dispositions of initial defense motions and are too vague
to lend much support to a corporate negligence argument. Thus it
would appear that, at least at the present time, hospital liability for
medical maltreatment on a theory of corporate negligence is not a
likelihood in Florida. Furthermore, there are no statutory rules re-
garding Physician's Assistants aside from the requirements that their
"service be rendered under the responsible supervision and control
of a licensed physician," and that they be "physician's trained assis-
tants."'10 4 If those mandates are observed (what a "trained assistant"
is is something that would probably be determined by custom and
usage), then a hospital would apparently only need further observe
any self-imposed standards to avoid liability under a theory of cor-
porate negligence in a case involving a Physician's Assistant. Again
it would appear as if the relationship of the supervising physician
to the defendant hospital would be the critical factor in determining
institutional liability.
Conclusion
By now it is evident that the liability issues raised by the emer-
gence of the physician's assistant are quite different from the issues
raised by the prior licensing question. Licensure by definition is con-
cerned with prospective protection of the public, whereas the ques-
tion of who ought to be liable if something goes wrong is of a post
facto nature. Given the fact that the physician's assistant statutes are
written in terms of "supervision and control by a licensed physician",
103 Reeves v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 191 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1966); Lab v. Hall, 200
So.2d 556 (Fla. 1967).
204 FLA. STAT. 458.13 (4.) (1970).
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there is little doubt that the supervising physician is legally account-
able for any mishap involving a physician's assistant whom he is
supervising. However, the chief concern of this paper has been the
potential liability of the involved hospital in three states with recent
physician's assistant legislation. Does their projected handling of the
hospital liability question in cases involving physician's assistants
withstand analysis?
It is this author's contention that no significant changes in the
law of hospital liability ought to result from the introduction of an
ancillary member of the health care delivery team-particularly one
who has solely dependent functions. If new doctrines of hospital
liability are to be put into effect, let it be done either directly through
legislation or at the least in a case involving a primary health pro-
fessional-preferably a physician. A literal application of respondeat
superior ("let the master respond") would limit liability to
the controlling physician;10 5 however, as we have seen, respondeat
superior has an alternative theoretical foundation-the existence of
an employment relationship regardless of the right to control. This
latter theory embodies the concept that he whose business is being
furthered ought to bear all the costs and responsibilities of that
enterprise. To base liability on either foundation would be acceptable
and defendable result as long as consistency in its application was
maintained.
California would most probably be internally consistent in deter-
mining its law of hospital liability in a case involving a physcian's
assistant as it would most likely make decisive the existence or non-
existence of an employment, or agency, relationship between the
hospital and the supervising physician. That is the same analysis
applied in a case involving only a physician and a hospital. Colorado
also appears to be internally consistent in its determination of the
question at issue as its general attitude has been that responsibility
ought to follow the right to control. Accordingly, Colorado has con-
sistently refused to hold a hospital liable for the negligence of even
an employee-physician as he is conceived of as independent pro-
fessional. Because of that theory as well as the language of the Child
Health Associate law, Colorado most likely would impose liability in
a case involving a child health associate solely on the supervising
physician and not on the hospital. Florida appears to have adopted
the same analysis as California-i.e. making the existence of an em-
ployment relation between the supervising physician and the defen-
dant hospital decisive. Superficially, there appears to be a conflict
105 This is a view which has also been expressed to the author by the Chief of the
Health Facilities Service of the Oklahoma State Department of Health. ". . . the
potential institutional liability for permitting the Physician's Assistant to function
with and for his supervising physician should be ameliorated under the doctrinal
defense of Respondeat Superior." Letter to the Author from W. Howard Miles,
Jan. 13, 1971.
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between California and Florida on the one hand and Colorado on the
other. However, the three states are quite consistent with one another
in their projected determination of a rule of hospital liability law
in a case involving a physician's assistant. Furthermore, their method
of resolving the issue is not only reasonable, but should be applauded.
All three states will make one question paramount in their deter-
mination of whether or not a hospital should be held liable in a case
involving a physician's assistant: under the law of this state, would
the hospital be held liable for the negligence of this (the supervising)
physician? In other words, look to the law of hospital liability for the
negligence of a physician to determine liability. Admittedly that
question has a different answer in Colorado than it has in California
and Florida. But what the response to that inquiry happens to be is
not what is most significant; what is most important analytically is
the question itself. The necessary corollary to that question is that,
absent flagrant or repeated violations of a physician's assistant sta-
tute or regulations, the fact of the introduction of the physician's
assistant to the health care team will not alter the rules of law of
hospital liability. 106 And that is as it should be, for the law ought to
facilitate, not complicate, the utilization of emerging categories of
health professionals.
10 Note that the potential liability of the supervising physician will be increased sig-
nificantly and he ought to confirm that his individual malpractice insurance covers
him in a case involving a Physician's Assistant.
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